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IN (PARTIAL) PRAISE OF (SOME) 
COMPROMISE: COMMENTS ON TEBBE 
CHAD FLANDERS1 
 I want to begin by sketching a point of view that, at best, 
makes only an implicit showing in Tebbe’s persuasive, thoughtful, 
and challenging book.  That viewpoint looks something like this:2 
religion is unique, not just in substance but also in form.  Start 
with substance: religion is a way of looking at the world as not 
exhausted by secular values or concerns; for money, prestige, or 
for “utility” broadly construed, or even exhausted by morality.  
Religion asks, repeatedly of those who believe in it, to do seemingly 
impossible things.  It counts on miracles.  Religion sees the world 
and our lives, fundamentally, as something that we did not make 
and which come to us as sort of a gift.  It tells us that others should 
be at the center of our universe and not ourselves.  And now, go to 
form: religion, to the believer, pervades that person’s life.  It is a 
structure of commands, in part; a collection of virtues, in part; a 
set of techniques for making it through the day, in part; and a 
relationship, in part.  In both of these ways (form and content), 
there is nothing quite like religion to many.  To put it another way, 
religion truly is special. 
 This point of view isn’t obviously present in Tebbe’s book, 
which is not to say that it isn’t there.  But at best, it is buried.  The 
sort of considerations that go into the social coherence method 
don’t include (at least on my reading) many considerations of this 
type.  The social coherentist looks at harm of a concrete, secular 
sort and fairness of an equal protection variety.  There is not much 
in the way of spiritual harm or the particular benefits of religion 
or the special demands and needs of religious believers.  Perhaps 
 
1 Thanks to Nelson Tebbe for his comments on a previous draft, and to the participants 
at the book symposium where this paper was first presented. All errors are my own.   
2 For an earlier attempt at a sketch of religion’s specialness, see Chad Flanders, The 
Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 257, 271 (2008). 
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for good reason are these harms, goods, demands, and needs 
excluded.  To some, they will simply not register; to some, they 
won’t count as reasons.  To still others, they might simply be the 
wrong kind of reasons to use in public debate. 
 This gets me to the problem, and the challenge, of Tebbe’s 
book, that I want to consider in this short essay about it.  Many 
see religion as special only in the sort of way I have described 
above.  But many others, the nonbelievers, will see religion as 
false, or nonsense, and on top of this presenting a very real risk of 
harm to people—especially nonbelievers.  What are we to do when 
there exists a divide like this?  This is my topic, and if I am more 
skeptical than Tebbe about a lasting solution, I do not side with 
those whom he calls the skeptics, or at least not entirely.  I do not 
share, I don’t think, the skeptics’ underlying conservatism.  I do 
not, generally, oppose the direction of social change we are heading 
in—or were heading in3—on health care, on gay marriage, etc.  
What I want is to find a framework of accommodation for that 
change.  One which does not force believers to change, but may 
nudge them in that direction.  Call it a modus vivendi if you like, 
but a better term might be compromise.  I find too little of that in 
Tebbe, but I think it is what we may need most of. 
 There are four very brief sections to my comment on Tebbe’s 
book. The first suggests some skepticism about social coherentism, 
and its hope to provide a neutral method for adjudicating disputes.  
I apply this skepticism in the second part to Tebbe’s discussion of 
what counts as “harm” and how to measure it.  The third and 
fourth parts deal with my favored way of dealing with our deep 
disagreements and compromises when it comes to associations and 
employment.  I should add here that nothing I say is meant to take 
away from Tebbe’s achievement in his book.  The writing is 
elegant; the reasoning sound.  I would consider it a high 
compliment if my remarks here were read as merely pointing out 
differences in how to apply Tebbe’s theories, not as any sort of 
fundamental disagreement.  For there is much that is great and 
good in this book, and much to agree with. 
 
 
3 This draft was prepared and written before Donald Trump was elected President. I 
am not sure I would say the same things in this paper if I knew the 2016 Election would 
turn out that way. I would surely not say these words in the same way.   
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I. SOCIAL COHERENCE 
 Tebbe’s method of social coherentism presents itself at once 
as both modest and ambitious.  The modesty is on display at the 
end of chapter one, where he writes, “The main point [of the 
chapter] is that . . . charges of necessary irrationality are out of 
place.”4 Disagreement, he goes on to say, is not the same as 
arbitrariness.5 Fair enough, and sound enough.  Each side to a 
debate will give reasons, or otherwise put, considerations in favor 
of their side.  And those reasons can be seen for the most part as 
reasons to the other side.  They can see the considerations as (at 
least) relevant, and not irrelevant, to the question at hand.  
Positions on religious freedom can be justified and warranted (and 
so, for that matter, can positions against religious freedom).   
 But then there is this other, ambitious part.  Tebbe writes 
in the introduction that “these questions of religion and equality 
law can be answered.”6 And, more profoundly in the Afterword, 
Tebbe calls for achieving “a more lasting unity” where “citizens 
who are subject to government regulation can understand why 
their arguments have been rejected, but also because they know 
that their arguments matter and someday may prevail.”7 Tebbe 
contrasts this unity with a mere “civil peace,”8 where there are 
more or less pragmatic accommodations, where each side gets 
something and the dispute is settled at least for a time, but where 
both sides do not quite understand one another, so they still 
remain—at the level of theory—divided. 
 There is a lot here to admire, both in the modest and the 
ambitious strains of Tebbe’s argument.  But I worry more about 
the ambitious strain.  Tebbe holds out hope to the short-term 
losers “of a particular fight” that their arguments “someday may 
prevail,” even though dissent may “intensify” in the short term.9 
Because I see the advantages of short-term compromise, I look at 
things a little differently.  Most of Tebbe’s conclusions in the body 
of the book show not just short term losses for one side, but long 
 
4 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 35 (2017). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 5. 
7 Id. at 199. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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term ones (will we reverse course on LGBT rights, on health care?  
My sense is that Tebbe not only does not think we will, but he 
actively hopes that we will not).  For me, the advantage of short-
term compromise (which I will get to in a bit) is that we can 
accommodate the losers, somewhat, as a means of transitioning to 
a more lasting unity where we do actually agree on most reasons 
and most policies.10   
 More deeply, though, what does Tebbe give to the losers?  
Here, I show my skeptical side.  Saying that both sides can appeal 
to reasons, and that therefore government policy need not be 
simply imposed, but imposed with a justification, just may move 
the debate between the two sides to a different level.  What, 
precisely, is the difference between saying, “Your policy lost 
because you do not have reasons on your side,” and, “Your policy 
lost because you have wrong or inadequate reasons on your side?”  
The policy upshot in both cases is the same, and so too is the sting 
of defeat.  And this is even buying Tebbe’s contention that both 
sides will be able to see each other’s reasons as reasons.  This is a 
very open question.  Those who see religion as false will not 
necessarily see protecting people’s relationship to a non-existent 
deity as a reason.  They will see it as a misguided emotional 
feeling, at best.  They will not see it as a consideration in favor of 
accommodating religion.11 
 I should not be misunderstood.  I am not attacking Tebbe for 
saying that there is one rational answer to questions on law and 
religion, and that he has provided us with it.  I am saying that the 
fact that there are many solutions and many rational solutions 
may just repackage the skeptic’s worry at another level.  The 
skeptics will now worry that they will lose, because their reasons 
will not be looked at as persuasive reasons or reasons at all, even 
though they can see them as reasons.  The fact that the solution 
that “wins” will have reasons behind it, whether that will win 
people’s assent depends on how many of those reasons overlap 
with their reasons, which in many of these cases, will not be many.  
Moreover, the fact that there will be many solutions, even on the 
 
10 The advantage of compromise, too, is that it may preserve some gains going forward, 
and avoid a backlash, where we end up worse where we were before. I elaborate more on 
both of these points later in the paper.   
11 At the same time, I should add that I believe that both sides to the debate should see 
religious freedom as a value, even if they think most or all religions are false.   
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coherence model, I do not think will help that much, unless (again) 
we can show a great convergence on one solution.  Maybe we can 
get there, but I am skeptical. 
II. HARM -- DEFINING IT AND AVOIDING IT 
 It may help to give an example of the problems of coherence 
as I see it.  I find such a difficulty in Tebbe’s chapter on harm.12 
Tebbe, building on his writings co-authored with Richard 
Schragger and Micah Schwartzman,13 criticizes the Hobby Lobby 
ruling, in particular the passage where Justice Alito insists—and 
almost guarantees—that with the accommodation he proposes, the 
cost to women who are employed by Hobby Lobby would be 
“precisely zero.”14 The line, as Tebbe rightly notes, almost has to 
be false, and its fake precision nearly underscores its obvious 
falseness.15 How could anything that replaced the contraceptive 
mandate have a cost of exactly and precisely zero?  How could any 
transition away from the original plan be costless in terms of time 
or money?  So Tebbe is surely right about this.16 
 
12 See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and 
the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375 (2016) (discussing the problem of 
defining “harm”).   
13 See generally Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, Symposium: 
Zubik and the Demands of Justice, SCOTUSBLOG (May 16, 2016, 9:07 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/symposium-zubik-and-the-demands-of-justice/; 
Richard Schragger, Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, The Contraception Compromise, 
SLATE (Apr. 14, 2016, 4:51 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/04/seven_sisters_are_
open_to_obamacare_contraception_compromise.html; Micah Schwartzman, Richard 
Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Obergefell and the End of Religious Reasons for Lawmaking, 
RELIGION & POL. (June 29, 2015), http://religionandpolitics.org/2015/06/29/obergefell-and-
the-end-of-religious-reasons-for-lawmaking/; Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe & Robert 
Tuttle, Indiana’s New Law Allows Discrimination. That Was the Point, SLATE (Mar. 30, 
2015, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/30/gov_mike_pence_s_characterization_of_in
diana_s_new_religion_law_is_wrong.html; Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah 
Schwartzman, Utah “Compromise” to Protect LGBT Citizens from Discrimination Is No 
Model for the Nation, SLATE (Mar. 18, 2015, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/18/gay_rights_the_utah_compromise_is_no_
model_for_the_nation.html; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The 
New Law of Religion, SLATE (July 3, 2014, 11:54 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/after_hobby_lobby
_there_is_only_rfra_and_that_s_all_you_need.html. 
14 TEBBE, supra note 4, at 51.  
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
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 But that to me only raises more questions.  I want to start 
with some basic, practical ones, and then transition to the deeper 
theoretical ones.  My first questions deal with what we can call the 
baseline problem and the threshold problem.17 Tebbe does deal 
with the baseline problem, but he does so in what is to my mind 
an unsatisfactory way.18 He writes that we should not take the 
baseline as a libertarian one, where because Hobby Lobby’s 
employees didn’t have health benefits before, they shouldn’t expect 
to have them now.19 I agree with Tebbe that we should reject this 
free-market, no state benefit, baseline.20 But Tebbe mentions and 
then does not deal with another obvious candidate for a baseline: 
why isn’t the baseline on all government programs that they 
accommodate religious liberty?21 On this picture, if Hobby Lobby 
had a right to be exempted from the contraceptive mandate—a 
very big if, I grant you—then the employees of Hobby Lobby had 
no right, no legitimate expectation, to the contraceptive coverage 
in the first place.22 And so they are not harmed when it turns out 
that they do not get it.  The religious accommodation baseline 
makes even more sense if we look at RFRA’s language, and the 
fact that it was temporally prior to the ACA.   
 Tebbe’s answer to this may be that we have to look at all the 
values at play to fix the baseline and to see what counts as harm, 
and accommodation under RFRA is only one of those values.  Fair 
enough.  We have to look at all the values, and if they pass some 
sort of threshold, we say that the accommodation can’t happen.  
This is what I call the “threshold problem.”  How do we know when 
we’ve crossed the threshold?  Consider the two obvious harms that 
might befall Hobby Lobby’s employees if their access to 
contraception is delayed due to the religious objections of Hobby 
Lobby.  First, there is the immediate harm of Hobby Lobby 
imposing its religion on its nonbelieving employees—those who 
are either of no religion or not of the Greens’ religion—which forces 
them, at the very least, to wait until they get covered by the 
 
17 Id.  
18 Id.   
19 Id. 
20 TEBBE, supra note 4, at 51.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 50. 
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mandate.23 And second, there are the harms faced by individual 
women not getting access to contraceptive coverage for some 
amount of time.  This harm could be something as simple as 
having to pay for contraception themselves, or as complicated as 
an unwanted pregnancy. 
 These are very different kinds of harms, and present 
different kinds of problems.  The first kind of harm, one of 
endorsement, seems like an all or nothing harm.  You are harmed 
by endorsement if you have to bear any kind of cost, even the most 
minor (even “three pence”24).  Even if the accommodation means 
taxpayers pay more, even a little bit more, hasn’t there been an 
imposition on others and what is more, it is an imposition because 
of a person’s religion.  Almost anything means we’ve crossed the 
threshold into harm, which seems in a way right, but in another 
seems like it cannot be right, because then any accommodation 
that had any effect on others would have to be ruled out, as causing 
the harm of endorsement.  So maybe we just throw endorsement 
into the mix, along with other types of harm, in trying to figure out 
whether we’ve passed some threshold above which accommodation 
of religion is no longer acceptable.   
 So consider the second kind of harm, viz., the concrete harms 
that would be suffered by women who are now without 
contraception (because of the delay caused by the need to fashion 
an accommodation).  This second type of harm seems more like 
something we would need to measure, that is not simply there, and 
so is something where we might need to know the true magnitude 
of the harm in order to see at what point we get to an “undue 
hardship” to use Tebbe’s favored standard.25 Again, the types of 
harms are not too hard to see, and Tebbe speculates about what 
they are: unintended pregnancies, increased abortions, and (again, 
at the very least) more out of pocket costs for uncovered women.  
On top of this, there are the further harms to women who were 
 
23 Id. at 51. The idea here is that if Hobby Lobby does not have to cover its employees 
directly because of RFRA, there will be some delay before a separate mandate that is funded 
by the insurance companies gets implemented. 
24 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82, 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) 
(rejecting support for an establishment of religion, even if it only amounts to “three pence”).   
25 TEBBE, supra note 4, at 62 (noting that the undue hardship standard “has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to address precisely the problem of shifting harm to 
others” and “has been interpreted by lower courts in a sensible way”). 
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because of the Court’s decision unable to delay birth, and so suffer 
economic, social and political losses.  These are harms that were 
bound to happen by the Hobby Lobby decision, at some level of 
magnitude, so Alito has to have been simply wrong when he said 
that there would be no cost. 
 Is this kind of speculation enough?  I am not sure.  Do we 
need to know how many women suffered and how much they 
suffered to see whether we’ve passed the threshold?  What if it 
turned out that there were only two unintended pregnancies that 
are directly attributable to the Hobby Lobby decision?  What if 
many women were able to seek and find low or no cost 
contraception?  Do these kind of (to my mind, a little impertinent) 
questions matter in how we analyze the harm?  Do we need to 
know over the long haul if the unintended pregnancies really did 
cause an economic or political loss to the women?  Or do we reach 
a point where the harm “depends on too many factors to draw a 
causal connection”?26 In any event, aren’t these the type of 
questions that are relevant to seeing whether there is merely a 
“hardship” as opposed to an “undue hardship”?27 
 And then we get what is to my mind is the really hard 
question.  Stipulate that there is hardship; stipulate that the 
hardship is undue and real.  How do we balance this against the 
other looming, and possible hardship, viz., the hardship that 
would be faced by Hobby Lobby?  Do we weigh things in this 
fashion—or does the undue hardship on third parties 
automatically outweigh any burden on the religious believer?  I do 
not know the answer to this question on Tebbe’s picture, and that 
worries me.  I can agree that Alito blundered, but I may think that 
even so given the gravity of the religious harm at stake—an 
asserted complicity with murder—it could be that the harms on 
the other side were accommodated enough, given account of 
enough, both because of what I see the baseline as, and what I see 
as the concrete harms on the other side. 
 So this is what I meant when I said in the previous part that 
social coherence may just change the way we look at 
disagreements, but it may not make those disagreements any less 
fierce, any less intractable.  We can agree that both sides have 
 
26 Id. at 58.  
27 Id. at 62. 
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reasons, but we may disagree about what the best reasons are, and 
how to weigh those reasons.  We may have gotten precisely 
nowhere, substantively, toward an agreement.  We have just 
changed the terms of that disagreement.   
III. PROTECTING ASSOCIATIONS 
 I find Tebbe’s discussion of freedom of association generally 
agreeable.  In particular, I appreciate Tebbe’s focus on the purpose 
of institutions and calibrating the level of protection to the 
association based on the function it fulfills.  Others, most notably 
Paul Horwitz, have also championed this approach, and it makes 
sense.28 Different institutions do different things and, more 
importantly, need different things and so some associations may 
require more freedom and more autonomy to function adequately 
given what they are.29 What I also especially like about this 
approach is that it makes the freedom of associations less formal—
less a matter of simply getting out of the way of associations.  
Instead, it says that associations deserve a certain amount of 
freedom because of the goods they help us realize, not because of 
any sort of right-as-trump they can assert against the government. 
 But part of my job in this essay is to quibble, and so quibble 
I must, and quibble in service of my larger thesis.  That thesis, 
again, was that social coherence may not get us to much in the way 
of agreement, that it only will (at best) reproduce our 
disagreement in a different register, and so we may be better off 
going with a sort of modus vivendi compromise, as a way of 
managing social change and deep (but reasonable) disagreement.  
And if in the previous part on harm I argued that many might 
think that Tebbe’s definition of harm is too vague to do any work 
here I want to raise questions about whether we should accept 
Tebbe’s—somewhat strong—version of freedom of association.  If 
in the last part I leaned right (defending the claims of religious 
believers), in this part I lean left (defending egalitarianism).  But 
the goal is the same: to show that these abstract principles will be 
 
28 See generally PAUL HOROWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013). For my own 
take on religious institutionalism, see generally Chad Flanders, Religious Organizations 
and the Analogy to Political Parties, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 103 
(Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016).  
29 TEBBE, supra note 4, at 81. 
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interpreted in very different ways, depending on what 
considerations we feel are the most important, and where we may 
(and in fact do) deeply disagree. 
 Start with the easy point that the three categories that 
Tebbe identifies—intimate associations, community groups, and 
values organizations—cannot be put into firm categories and can 
tend to blur into one another.30 So we should see them on a 
continuum, and I do not think Tebbe would disagree with this (and 
indeed has elsewhere used the language of seeing the various 
groups on a “spectrum”).  On one end are the intimate associations, 
which are important, Tebbe says, to identity and on the other end 
are values organizations, which have their own value as important 
contributors to public debate; community groups are somewhere 
in between and share characteristics with both intimate 
associations and values organizations (this again shows how 
Tebbe’s distinctions are not set up like silos).31 As we move from 
intimate associations to values organizations, the protection 
decreases, and the public interest increases.  The middle group, 
community groups, are important sites of “social capital” and also 
influence citizens’ “ideas and impulses.”32 
 Let me focus on an example of an association: a private golf 
and tennis club.  Here we have, arguably, a place of somewhat 
intimate association, where not only are friendships made, but 
also business deals are struck, and where the conversations can 
run the gamut from frivolous to deeply serious.  So we should keep 
this community group relatively free from government 
intervention, right?  Well, maybe.  It may depend on how large it 
is, how exclusive it is and how bureaucratic it is.33 The 
“immunity,” as Tebbe says, for these community groups is only 
presumptive.34 But why should my golf and tennis club enjoy this 
presumptive immunity?  Suppose it wants to limit its membership 
to women only.  Why not force it to integrate no matter how small 
it is?  After all, there may even be benefits to forced integration of 
this sort—why assume the only positives are on the side of group 
 
30 Id.   
31 Id. at 83. 
32 Id.   
33 Id. at 84. 
34 Id.  
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exclusivity?  I do not see much willful formation or civic solidarity 
present, at least of the kind we might want.  Nor do these groups 
really enrich public debate at all.      
 And why not double down on equality?  Is it impossible to 
imagine non-crazy, plausible restrictions on even intimate 
association?  Maybe we want to say everyone has to send their kids 
to public schools and there is no right of privacy to allow parents 
to avoid a public, more-or-less secular, education (there was a big 
to-do about this a while ago).35 Why cannot equality go at least 
this far, not to abolish the family but simply to make children go 
to public schools so that they can avoid harmful ideas about gender 
norms, for example?  Does this interfere with the right of intimate 
association, or make it impermissible?  “But what about equality?”, 
I want to say.    
 Suppose I do say that: what is the response that the 
coherentist gives, that she does not share the intuition that the 
right of intimate association requires the right of parents to choose 
where and how to education their children?  That seems a thin 
reed indeed.  Or maybe we discuss the good of intimate 
association.  This is where I would go—but how are we able to 
weigh that good against the good of equality (because surely it is a 
good)?  In the later chapters of Tebbe’s book, equality almost 
always seems to win; I just wonder if the liberal egalitarian will 
wonder here, in this early chapter, why equality shouldn’t win too.  
Or maybe the liberal egalitarian will say: intimate association is 
fine, but I draw the line at children.  There are places in the 
chapter regarding freedom of employment where Tebbe almost, 
but not quite, reaches this conclusion.  He does show some 
sympathy with Seana Shiffrin’s argument that children have a 
distinct interest in developing “independence of mind.”36 
 Again, though, my overarching point remains: how is the 
method coherence supposed to settle these sorts of debates, and 
find the right answer?  If we are uncertain that it can, then we 
might be tempted to look to another, perhaps more promising 
route—not a route toward an answer, but something less: a route 
 
35 See Marc DiGirolami, Chemerinsky Urges Compulsory Public Schooling and the 
Elimination (and Unconstitutionality?) of Private Schooling, MIRROR OF JUST. (Jan. 6, 
2013) http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/01/chemerinsky-urges-
compulsory-public-schooling-and-the-eimination-and-unconstitutionality-of-private-.html.  
36 TEBBE, supra note 4, at 160.   
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to a feasible compromise.  I explore this option in the next, and 
final, part of my paper.     
IV. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
 There is a line, a few pages into the chapter on employment 
discrimination, which I feel Tebbe’s position is a little too hard on 
pragmatism, and on its cousin, compromise.  It comes, fittingly, in 
a discussion on the Utah Compromise on gay rights and religious 
organizations.  Tebbe writes that the Utah compromise “can be 
supported on pragmatic grounds, as a kind of modus vivendi, but 
it sits uncomfortably with mediating principles that account for 
our judgments in civil rights law.”37 Later on in the book, those 
judgments on civil rights law come through clearly and end up 
winning much of the time.  But even in this passage, Tebbe 
concludes that the exemption offered by the Utah compromise is 
uncomfortable and “too broad” and that it creates “dissonance,” 
which is presumably a very bad thing for an approach that prizes 
and indeed makes as the basis for justification “coherence.”38 
 But there are virtues to compromise, and I want to rehearse 
them now and, to a great extent, endorse them.  Of course, the 
problem with compromises is obvious: compromises will always be 
open to the objection that they are not principled, or better yet, 
that they do not fit either side’s principles very well.  No one gets 
exactly what they want, and so neither side is fully happy.  At the 
same time, neither side is fully unhappy.  That is the benefit of 
compromise.  We each get some of what we want, so no one goes 
away completely unsatisfied.  So while we sacrifice the best case 
scenario, we avoid the worst case. 
 Compromises can also buy us time.  Compromises are not 
for all time, they do not end things, as a principled conclusion 
might.  (If we got the right principles, why should we change; 
indeed, why should we want to budge at all?)  Buying time may 
mean that things on the ground change.  It may give institutions 
time to have discussions on the inside, and they may come to 
evolve in a way that the tension disappears between religious 
 
37 Id. at 151-52.   
38 Id. at 151.   
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belief and civic equality.39 Or some institutions may stick to their 
guns, but they may decide to retrench, that is, they may decide 
that it is not worth fighting all the time to be both, say, an 
institution with public functions like a school or a hospital, and 
that they should just stand down and become a church—a purely 
religious organization.  Both things are good news for 
progressives—but they require that progressives not go for the win 
right away; it requires that they wait.  Compromise, on my view, 
gives both sides at least a structure to hope for and maybe pursue 
social change.  Social change might not happen, of course—and it 
may even be the case that progressives themselves will be the ones 
that change, and appreciate the position of the believers who do 
not want to change.  Compromise does not give us unity, but it does 
give us civil peace, and this is no small thing.  Moreover, in giving 
something to each side, compromise pay prevent a backlash: the 
side that gets some of what it wants, now, may forestall the 
possibility that when the side that seems to be losing wins and gets 
more power, it will turn back the clock.     
 So much for my defense of compromise.  I think compromise 
is an option Tebbe does not explore fully or fully enough to my 
liking.  For what happens if one side or the other rejects the 
principle that that the other side sees as necessary for any kind of 
coherence?  We get a war, or proxy wars, or one side may simply 
lose—not because it died out naturally or because it decided to 
become something else, but because the other side won.  I think we 
should only accept this if we think that coherence can only be had 
by one set of principles and not the other, and that it is fairly 
obvious that this is the case.  But I think it is fairly obvious that 
this is not the case, and both sides can be reasoned, and coherent.   
 Take some things that Tebbe says in the chapters on 
association and employment discrimination that people might, on 
principled grounds, reject.  First, might they not reject that what 
Tebbe calls value organizations—large bureaucratic structures, 
such as national religious organizations—exist for something 
more than just to contribute to pluralism and a diverse debate?  
Tebbe (as I pointed out in the previous Part) gives a functional 
 
39 See generally Chad Flanders, Accommodation and Compromise: Turning Hard Cases 
into Easier Ones (Oct. 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (expanding 
on the possibility that buying time through compromises can lead to the departure of 
tension between religious belief and civic equality).  
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account of the rights of religious organizations and of associations 
generally; I am in broad sympathy with this approach, and have 
argued for a version of it myself.  But Tebbe I think is too narrow 
in his understanding of what goods are out there for those groups 
to realize.  He seems to limit their role to that of being expressive 
associations.      
 There is another thing that these groups do, however.  I take 
it that it is not crazy to think the promotion of religious belief itself 
may be a good.  In fact, far from thinking this is not crazy, I tend 
to think that religion is itself a unique human good, and that 
religious organization insofar as they are good at protecting and 
promoting this good, deserve an extra kind of associational 
freedom.  It is not just because religious organizations being out 
there make for a type of diversity; they may do this as well, but 
maybe they do not.  Religious organizations may, at many points, 
simply reproduce the positions of other secular groups and may 
even do that pretty poorly.  But religious organizations may also, 
on top of this, simply promote religion as such.  I certainly hope 
that they would do this, and that they also should do this, and the 
associational protection that we give to them reflects the fact that 
we want them to do this.  The religious believer then will (perhaps) 
give greater protection to religious organizations than Tebbe will, 
and for this reason, viz., that religion is a good thing—and why is 
not this also a coherent thing to believe?  It is just that the 
religious believer finds his coherence by emphasizing the 
uniqueness and importance of religion40 over the importance of 
diverse public debate. 
 More deeply still, most religious organizations—however 
large—can seem to be rather intimate.  Many people who belong 
even to large churches see those as essential to identity formation 
and their sense of themselves as persons.  And spiritual 
relationships may work differently than intimate ones, or rather, 
they can be intimate in different ways.  Many, most, Catholics 
have never met the Pope or maybe even their parish priest.  But 
they do in some sense have a very personal, very intimate 
relationship with them—or at least they could, or they could think 
they do (and maybe in this case thinking there is a relationship is 
not too far from actually having a relationship).  They may view 
 
40 On this, recall the defense of the value of religion with which I began this essay.   
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fellow Catholics as family, and as the church—even not their local 
church—as a sort of home.  When they travel, they can find a 
haven in a church of their denomination, and know (somehow) that 
they are among friends.  The church can be a large, bureaucratic 
institution, but it can also and at the same time be intimate.  This 
may be yet another way—the religious believer could conclude—
in which religion is special and how religion frustrates easy efforts 
to categorize it, its institutions, and the corresponding protection 
we should give to them.   
 Second, we should consider the case of Flint Dollar.41 I 
believe Tebbe sees his case as an easy or even straightforward one, 
that he was simply a music teacher who should not have been fired 
for posting on Facebook that he had become engaged to his same-
sex partner.  But is it unprincipled, does it show a lack of 
coherence, to say that in religious schools even music teachers are 
engaged in a sort of ministry, and that therefore they have to set 
an example—in word and in deed—for the students?  Bracket even 
for a second whether music is an important part of the spiritual 
mission of the school, so that the music teacher is a kind of 
minister.  That idea seems plausible to me, at least as plausible as 
the argument that a church organist is not merely a musician but 
an active religious presence in a church service.42 I think that a 
religious school could emphasize that every teacher is supposed to 
be living the mission of the church and that this trumps any 
equality principle that may be implicated.  Now, I want to ask: 
why is there not at least as much plausible coherence in this 
position, as there is in Tebbe’s?  Where does the religious believer 
go wrong, so that her position is not just different than Tebbe’s, 
but also in some sense dissonant, not just with Tebbe’s beliefs but 
with her own?  The religious believer will simply say that she 
draws the line on equality at the church door, and with the role of 
the teacher as role model and example.  Do not get me wrong.  I do 
not like the firing of Flint Dollar, I will say that much.43 But I do 
 
41 TEBBE, supra note 4, at 142, 157.   
42 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the music director of a church acted in a “ministerial” role), abrogated on other grounds 
by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).   
43 What I want—and what Tebbe may want—is a world in which an institution can be 
both religious and egalitarian, where liberal values find a place within religion and are not 
always pitted against it. Such a vision is present in JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 80 (2d 
ed. 2013), which I have always thought was an underrated book. But the book did not 
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not want to say that those who support it are somehow incoherent, 
and that at pains of being incoherent, they have to give up their 
position about religious school autonomy. 
 Which is what gets me back to compromise.  What I see in 
many of these religious debates, or conscience wars, as some have 
named them, is two deeply divided sides, with viable reasons on 
both of those sides.  We could plausibly argue each side.  I want to 
put off the day where we have to say one side simply has to win.  If 
compromises can put off that day, then I say that is a vote in favor 
of compromise.  Sometimes respect means stopping short of 
getting everything we want, which may bring us closer to the day 
when not just one side wins, but everybody does. 
 
 
describe our world when it was written, nor does it describe our world now. The question 
then, is what to do in the meantime, before religion and liberalism do become a common 
faith? My argument in the text is that compromise may both the best we can do, and the 
best means of progress to the hopeful vision Dewey laid out.   
